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Recap; Kohler v. Keller Transport, Inc.; Westchester Surplus Lines 
Insurance Company v. Keller Transport, Inc.: After a Confessed 
Judgment, is an Insurer Entitled to a Reasonableness Hearing in the 
Underlying Tort Action? 
Kristen Zadick  
Nos. DA 12-0600 and DA 14-0278 Montana Supreme Court 
 
Oral Argument: Friday, September 11, 2015, at 10:00 AM in the Holiday 
Inn Missoula Downtown, Missoula, Montana. 
 
 
I. JONATHAN HACKER FOR APPELLANT WESTCHESTER SURPLUS LINES 
INSURANCE COMPANY (“WESTCHESTER”) 
 
Mr. Hacker opened his argument by asserting Westchester 
performed everything required of it under the insurance policy and more. 
As required by the policy, Westchester advanced payment for clean-up 
following the gasoline spill. Additionally, Westchester paid the insureds’ 
defense costs up to the $4 million commercial automobile limit, even 
though the terms of the policy did not create a duty to provide a defense.  
Questions from the justices largely centered on three topics: (1) 
the construction of Westchester’s excess insurance policy in light of both 
the primary insurance policy issued by Carolina and a federally-
prescribed endorsement to the excess insurance policy; (2) the 
implication of commercial general liability (“CGL”) coverage; and (3) 
the reasonableness hearing held in the Missoula County district court.  
The justices challenged the interpretation of the excess insurance 
policy on several levels. Justice Shea inquired whether the excess policy 
applied in the same manner as the primary policy issued by Carolina 
since the excess policy followed the form of the primary policy. Justice 
Shea noted that if the excess policy followed the form of the primary 
policy, the excess policy should provide separate limits for both 
commercial automobile coverage and CGL coverage, as the primary 
policy did. Mr. Hacker responded that the excess and primary policies 
differed because the primary policy did not contain an aggregate limit, 
while the excess policy issued by Westchester included such a limit. 
According to Mr. Hacker, although the excess policy followed the form 
of the primary policy, it did so only in that it provided coverage for the 
same types of occurrences as the primary policy.  
Questions regarding the MCS-90 endorsement, which is an 
endorsement to the excess insurance policy required by federal law, 
focused on the effect of the endorsement on the interpretation of the 
policy, namely the “general aggregate.” Justice Baker asked Mr. Hacker 
to address the Missoula County District Court’s determination that the 
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MCS-90 supported an ambiguity in the excess insurance policy. Mr. 
Hacker responded that the endorsement was irrelevant to the 
interpretation of the policy language and did not change the limits under 
the excess policy. Rather, the endorsement is meant to assure the public 
that certain motor carriers satisfy minimum insurance requirements. 
Justice Shea questioned the express language of the MCS-90 
endorsement that indicated the endorsement changed the excess policy. 
In response, Mr. Hacker again emphasized the endorsement did not 
expand coverage and Westchester should not be held responsible for 
ambiguities that arise from the endorsement because Westchester did not 
author the federally-prescribed endorsement. Additionally, Mr. Hacker 
noted no federal cases have interpreted the endorsement to expand or 
alter coverage limits.  
Mr. Hacker argued Westchester did not breach a duty to defend 
its insureds because the excess policy expressly allowed for an option, 
but not a duty, to participate in the insureds’ defense. Under an option to 
defend, Mr. Hacker noted an insurer may withdraw from the defense so 
long as the withdrawal does not prejudice the insured. Mr. Hacker argued 
Westchester properly withdrew from the defense upon exhausting the 
limits. Because trial was more than a year away at the time of 
Westchester’s withdrawal, the insureds did not suffer prejudice.  
In response to Chief Justice McGrath’s prompting, Mr. Hacker 
addressed the adequacy of the reasonableness hearing held in the 
Missoula County declaratory judgment action. Mr. Hacker argued the 
reasonableness hearing was inadequate because the wrong decision-
maker conducted the hearing and the district court used the incorrect 
standard to review the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. Mr. 
Hacker argued Judge Langton should have conducted the hearing in the 
tort action because that court had a better understanding of the facts 
underlying the judgment because it entered the confessed judgment. 
Further, Mr. Hacker argued the Missoula County District Court erred by 
considering only the Homeowners’ evidence. Justice Shea noted the 
Missoula County District Court applied the same standard used to set 
aside a jury verdict, finding the amount fell within the range a jury could 
have awarded. In response, Mr. Hacker advocated for the standard set in 
Tidyman’s v. Management Services, Incorporated v. Davis,
1 which requires the insurer to present sufficient evidence to create a 
genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the amount of the 
judgment. Mr. Hacker argued that because the insurer bears the burden to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of fact, the district court should have 
permitted Westchester to conduct discovery and cross examine the 
opposing party’s expert witnesses.  
 
                                           
1 330 P.3d 1139, 1154 (Mont. 2014).  
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II. ROGER SULLIVAN FOR APPELLEES HOMEOWNERS 
 
Mr. Sullivan opened his argument by noting Westchester’s 
appeal hinged on a special definition of a $4 million “general aggregate” 
limit, but the insurer failed to define the term.  
Questions from the justices focused on several topics: (1) the 
effect of the MCS-90 endorsement on the interpretation of the policy; (2) 
the number of occurrences that triggered coverage under the excess 
policy; and (3) the adequacy of the reasonableness hearing.  
Mr. Sullivan noted that because the Westchester policy followed 
the form of the Carolina policy, the excess policy provided by 
Westchester should have applied in a manner similar to Carolina’s 
policy. Because the Carolina policy provided separate limits for 
automobile and CGL coverage, Westchester’s policy should have 
provided separate limits. The form following nature of the excess 
insurance policy contradicted Westchester’s argument that “general 
aggregate” referred to the total limits under the excess insurance policy. 
Mr. Sullivan argued this contradiction created an ambiguity in the policy, 
and ambiguities are construed against the author of the policy. As the 
author of the policy, Westchester had the ability to define “general 
aggregate” but failed to do so.  
Mr. Sullivan argued that the language of the MCS-90 
endorsement emphasized the ambiguity because the endorsement 
changed the policy by providing that the policy limits applied separately. 
Justice Baker inquired whether any other cases, particularly federal 
cases, used the MCS-90 federal endorsement to determine the limits of 
the insurance policy. Mr. Sullivan did not directly address Justice 
Baker’s inquiry, but clarified that the Missoula County District Court did 
not use the endorsement to determine the limits of the policy. Rather, in 
light of Westchester’s reliance on an undefined term, the district court 
reviewed the entire policy, including the MCS-90 endorsement, to define 
“general aggregate.” The district court did not interpret the endorsement, 
but rather considered the endorsement in its interpretation of “general 
aggregate.”  
Justices Shea and McKinnon expressed concern as to the number 
of occurrences that triggered insurance coverage. In response to Justice 
Shea, Mr. Sullivan noted that two separate events triggered both the 
commercial automobile coverage and the CGL coverage. The first 
occurrence, the roll-over accident, triggered the commercial automobile 
coverage. The damages caused through the clean-up efforts triggered the 
CGL coverage. Justice McKinnon next asked whether both insurers 
acknowledged the two triggering events. Mr. Sullivan noted that 
although both insurers initially denied the implication of CGL coverage, 
Carolina later recognized the implication of the CGL coverage.  
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Turning to the breach argument, Mr. Sullivan argued that once 
Westchester started to defend the trucking companies, it assumed a duty 
to continue that defense and the insureds had reasonable expectations 
that Westchester would continue the defense. Mr. Sullivan noted 
Westchester’s unilateral withdrawal caused the insureds prejudice 
because the insureds’ attorney fees went unpaid for a number of months. 
Mr. Sullivan argued Westchester should have followed the procedure 
recommended by the Montana Supreme Court. The Court recommends 
that the insurer continue its defense under a reservation of rights and file 
a declaratory judgment action to determine whether coverage exists 
under the policy.2  
Finally, Mr. Sullivan analyzed the adequacy of the 
reasonableness hearing held in the declaratory judgment action. Mr. 
Sullivan framed his argument by explaining the course of action an 
insured may take after the insurer breaches its duty to defend by 
prematurely withdrawing from the defense. Mr. Sullivan noted that 
insureds acted within their rights by entering a confessed judgment with 
the injured party. Although judgment amounts must be reasonable, Mr. 
Sullivan noted the Missoula County district court found the amount to be 
reasonable. Mr. Sullivan argued Judge McLean properly reviewed the 
Homeowners’ expert reports, which contained all the relevant damage 
information, and determined that the amount fell within the range of 
what a jury could reasonably award. Justice Shea questioned why the 
review took place in the Missoula court, and Mr. Sullivan responded a 
reasonableness review can be conducted wherever judicial efficiency so 
requires.  
Finally, Justice Baker asked Mr. Sullivan to respond to 
Westchester’s argument that the court reviewing the reasonableness of a 
judgment cannot make a determination without allowing the party 
opposing the judgment to cross-examine the proponent’s expert 
witnesses. Mr. Sullivan responded that Westchester failed to carry the 
burden imposed on the insurer by Tidyman’s to produce evidence 
creating a genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the judgment. 
Concluding his argument, Mr. Sullivan argued Judge McLean was better 
suited to review the judgment amount because he was acquainted with 
the record. Mr. Sullivan added that to give the reasonableness hearing to 
Judge Langton, who was not as acquainted with the record, would violate 
Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, which calls for the 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of proceedings.3  
 
III. MR. HACKER’S REBUTTAL 
 
                                           
2 Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staples, 90 P.3d 381, 386 (Mont. 2004).  
3 MONT. R. CIV. P. 1.  
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Mr. Hacker’s rebuttal began with a question from Justice 
McKinnon seeking clarification as to whether the circumstances 
implicated CGL coverage and whether Westchester left the coverage 
untapped. In his response, Mr. Hacker emphasized the insureds 
themselves did not believe the facts implicated CGL coverage. Seeking a 
clear answer to Justice McKinnon’s inquiry, Justice Shea asked whether 
Westchester’s policy provided both automobile and CGL coverage. Mr. 
Hacker conceded that although the excess policy followed the form of 
the Carolina policy, which provided both automobile and CGL coverage, 
Westchester’s excess policy did not provide for separate automobile and 
CGL coverage. Rather, the excess policy followed form only in that it 
covered the same types of occurrences that Carolina’s primary policy 
covered. Mr. Hacker clarified the Westchester policy did not follow the 
form of the Carolina policy as to the limits.  
In his rebuttal, Mr. Hacker emphasized two points. First, the 
MCS-90 endorsement did not alter the coverage limits between 
Westchester and its insureds, and as such the district court incorrectly 
relied on the endorsement to find an addition $4 million in CGL 
coverage. Second, the “general aggregate” limit applied to the total limits 
available under the excess policy. Citing the relationship and course of 
dealing between Westchester and its insureds, Mr. Hacker noted the 
insureds themselves never thought the CGL coverage applied to the 
claim.  
As a final matter, Justice Shea asked Mr. Hacker to elaborate on 
the reasonableness hearing. Mr. Hacker argued the court that entered the 
confessed judgment should have conducted the hearing to review the 
reasonableness of the judgment. Further, Mr. Hacker argued the court 
that held the hearing should have permitted Westchester to conduct 




The Court’s principal concerns focused on the construction of 
Westchester’s excess insurance policy and the adequacy of the 
reasonableness hearing, and both Mr. Hacker and Mr. Sullivan stressed 
the two issues. The effect of both the Carolina policy and the federal 
endorsement on the excess policy may be dispositive of the coverage and 
breach issues. The adequacy of the reasonableness hearing in the 
Missoula County district court likely depends upon whether the Missoula 
County district court employed the proper standard in its review of the 
confessed judgment.  
The Court may find Westchester’s excess policy provided 
additional CGL coverage because the Westchester policy followed the 
form of the Carolina policy, which provided separate limits for both 
automobile and CGL coverage. Because Westchester conceded the 
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excess policy followed the form of Carolina’s policy, the excess policy 
should apply in a like manner, providing separate limits for automobile 
and CGL coverage. Although Westchester noted the policy disclaimed a 
duty to defend and contained a “general aggregate” limit, the language 
conflicts with the form following nature of the policy. Because the 
conflict creates an ambiguity, and Westchester failed to define a term it 
relied upon to deny coverage, the Court may find Westchester 
improperly withdrew from the defense, and in doing so, breached its duty 
to defend. As Mr. Sullivan argued, an insurer’s breach of its duty to 
defend makes the insurer liable for judgments against its insured, even 
those in excess of policy limits.4  
Although the justices’ questions focused heavily on the role of 
the federal MCS-90 endorsement, the Court may find the endorsement 
does not change the ambiguity created between the policy language and 
the form following nature of the excess policy. While Westchester 
argued the endorsement itself does not alter the limits of its policy, the 
Court may find the Missoula County District Court’s use of the 
endorsement to support its finding does not merit reversal because the 
ambiguity exists apart from the endorsement.  
The Court may find the Missoula County District Court held an 
inadequate reasonableness hearing because Westchester did not have the 
opportunity to cross-examine the Homeowners’ expert witnesses or 
conduct discovery. Each party advocated for a different standard to 
determine the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. While Mr. 
Hacker argued for the standard set forth in Tidyman’s, Mr. Hacker’s 
representation of the standard is not complete. Under Tidyman’s, as a 
threshold matter, the insurer must set forth specific facts that demonstrate 
the confessed judgment amount is unreasonable.5 At the hearing, 
however, the district court maintains the discretion to determine the 
parameters of the hearing and to decide whether further discovery is 
necessary.6 Because the burden of establishing the unreasonableness of 
the confessed judgment rested with Westchester, and Westchester was 
not permitted to conduct discovery to satisfy that burden, the Court may 
find the reasonableness hearing was inadequate. To remedy this issue, 
the Court may remand the case to the Missoula County District Court 
and direct the court to allow Westchester to cross-examine the 
Homeowners’ expert witnesses and conduct discovery as to damages.  
                                           
4 Indep. Milk & Cream Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 216 P. 1109, 1111 (Mont. 1923).  
5 Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1154.  
6 Id. at 1155.  
